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Virginia's Model Jury Instructions ("the Instructions") are intended to
be correct statements of the law which guide juries in reaching verdicts and
sentencing offenders.1 This article concerns the instructions given to a
capital jury at the sentencing phase of a trial, when the jury is charged with
making a penalty determination.' A capital jury in Virginia must find at
least one of two aggravating factors, vileness or future dangerousness, before
it can recommend a sentence of death? The current version of the Instruc-
* J.D. Candidate, May 2001, Washington & Lee University School of Law; B.S.,
Auburn University.
1. VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL (Lexis Law Publishing 1999). "The
Supreme Court of Virginia and the Virginia Court of Appeals have neither adopted nor
approved [the Instructions]." Id. at I-vi.
2. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4 (Michie 2000) (providing for a separate sentencing
phase in capital cases). This article addresses only the instructions given to a capital jury
during the sentencingphase of trial, after it has found the defendant guilty of a capital crime.
The Virginia General Assembly has also directed "that the Virginia Supreme Court, in
conjunction with the Virginia State Bar, investigate and recommend to the General Assembly
on or before January 1, 2001, model jury instructions for felonies, not including capital
murder, concerning the abolition of parole. Fisbback v. Commonwealth, 532 S.E.2d 629,632
n.3 (Va. 2000) (quoting 2000 VA. H.B. 705) (emphasis added).
3. Section 19.2-264.2 states that:
In assessing the penalty of any person convicted of an offense for which the death
penalty may b " mposed, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the
court or uruy shal (l) after consideration of the past criminal record of convic-
tions of the defendant, find that there is a probaBility that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious
threat to society or that his conduct in committing the offense for which he
stands charged was outrageously or wantonly vile, Horrible or inhuman in that
itinvolved toture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim; and
(2) recommend that te penaly of death be imposed.
VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2000).
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tions provides instructions for each of the statutory aggravating factors.4
This article seeks to update those instructions in order to provide a more
complete statement of the law of the Commonwealth.' Part II of this article
sets forth the current model jury instructions used in Virginia to instruct
juries on the aggravators of future dangerousness and vileness. Part TIT
provides suggested amendments to the vileness and future dangerousness
Instructions, along with examples of the judicial decisions and arguments
upon which those suggested amendments are based. Part IV discusses the
potential consequences of proffering the amended instructions suggested by
this article.
. Current ModelJury Instructions
The Instructions currently provide instruction 33.122 for use when the
Commonwealth has presented evidence of both vileness and future danger-
ousness which reads as follows:
You have convicted the defendant of an offense which may be
punished by death. You must decide whether the defendant shall
e sentenced to death or to imprisonment for life or to imprison-
ment for life and a fine of a specific amount, but not more than
$100,000.00. Before the penalty can be fixed at death the Com-
monwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt at feast one of
the following a ravating circumstances:
(1) That, r consideration of his history and background
there is a probability that he would commit ciiminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing seri-
ous threat to society;
or
(2) That his conduct in committing the offense was outra-
geously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman, in that
it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated
battery to the victim beyond the minimum necessary to
accomplish the act of murder.
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has
proved beyond a reasonable doubt both of these circumstances,
then you may fix the punishment of the defendant at death. But
if you nevertheless believe from all the evidence, including evi-
dence in mitigation, that the death penalty is not justified, then
you shall fix the punishment of the defendant at:
(1) Imprisonment for life; or
4. VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL Nos. 33.122, 33.125 (Lexis Law
Publishing 1999).
5. Virginia Code S 19.2-263.2 permits lawyers to introduce hand-crafted jury instruc-
tions, stating that "[a] proposed jury instruction submitted by a party, which constitutes an
accurate statement of the hw applicable to the case, shall not be withheld from the jury solely




(2) Imprisonment for life and a fine of a specific amount,
but not more than $100,000.00.
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has
proved beyond a reasonable doubt either of these circumstances,
then you may fix the punishment of the defendant at death. But
if you nevertheless be 'eve from all the evidence, including evi-
dence in mitigation, that the death penalty is not justified, then
you shall fix the punishment of the defendant at:3 Imprisonment for life; or
Imprisonment for life and a fine of a specific amount,
but not more than $100,000.00.
If the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt at least one of these circumstances, then you shall fix the
punishment of the defendant at:
13 Imprisonment for life; or
) .Imprisonment for life and a fine of a specific amount,
but not more than $100,000.00.
Any decision you make regarding punishment must be unani-
mous.
The version of Model Instruction 33.125 designed to be given to juries
when the Commonwealth has introduced evidence of future dangerousness,
but has not introduced evidence of vileness reads as follows:
You have convicted the defendant of an offense which may be
punished by death. You must decide whether the defendant shall
be sentenced to death or to imprisonment for life or to imprison-
ment for life and a fine of a specific amount but not more than
$100,000.00. Before the penalty can be fixed at death, the Com-
monwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following
aggravating circumstance:
That, after consideration of his history and background, there
is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has
proved that circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
may fix the punishment of the defendant at death. But if you
nevertheless believe from all the evidence, including evidence in
mitigation, that the death penalty is not justified, then you shall
fix the punishment of the defendant at:
1 -p risonment for life; or
2 Imprisonment for life and a fine of a specific amount, but
not more than $100,000.00.
If the Commonwealth has failed to prove that circumstance
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you shall fix the punishment of
the defendant at:




1) Imprisonment for life; or2Imprison  li  and a fine of a specific amount, but
not more than $100,000.00.
Any decision you make regarding punishment must be unani-
mous.
The version of Model Instruction 33.125 for use when the Common-
wealth has introduced only evidence of vileness is nearly identical to the
instruction for future dangerousness.8 The phrase "[t]hat, after consider-
ation of his history and background, there is a probability that he would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious
threat to society" is replaced by the phrase "[t]hat his conduct in committing
the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that
it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated battery to the victim
beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish the act of murder."9
X11 Proposed Model Jury Instructions Based on Case Law
Virginia Code section 19.2-263.2 allows attorneys to proffer jury
instructions other than those contained in the Instructions.0 "It is permissi-
ble of course to draft instructions in the language of the applicable statute,
but it is not obligatory to do so if the meaning of the law is not changed by
the language used."" The following proposed model jury instructions on
the aggravating factors of vileness and future dangerousness are based upon
statements of the law found in the Virginia Code, decisions of the Supreme
Court of Virginia, and decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
A. Vileness
1. The Far-Reaching Definition of Vileness
Virginia Code section 19.2-264.2 states in pertinent part that "a sentence
of death shall not be imposed unless the court or jury shall ... find.., that
[the defendant's] conduct in committing the offense for which he stands
charged was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it
involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to the victim
.... .,' The United States Supreme Court has ruled that "[W]here discretion
is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of





11. Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 292 S.E.2d 798, 808 (Va. 1982) (approving Language
used in the Instructions which differed from the statutory language).
12. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2000). For a more complete discussion of the
expansion of the vileness predicate to conceivably include most capital murders, see Douglas
R. Banghart, V-deness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF J. 77 (1999).
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whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be
suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary
and capricious action." 3 As the Court noted in Godfrey v. Georgia,4 "[a]
person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every murder
as 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.'""5 A capital
sentencing scheme must therefore provide some meaningful guidance to
juries to give them a rational basis for distinguishing circumstances in which
the death penalty should be imposed from circumstances in which it is not
warranted.
1 6
Virginia's current model jury instructions do not provide such guidance
to jurors, nor does the explicit language of section 19.2-264.2." Although
the statute and the model instructions modify the terms "wantonly vile,
horrible or inhuman" with the terms "torture, depravity of mind [and]
aggravated battery," the sub-elements do not, of themselves, provide suffi-
cient guidance to jurors. Although the Supreme Court of Virginia has held
that "it is not reversible error for a trial court to refuse to define the statu-
tory terms included in the aggravating circumstances upon which a sentence
of death may be based," the inclusion of the definitions of the sub-elements
of the vileness predicate would assist juries in making reasonable, rationally
reviewable decisions." The Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that
it is conceivable that the language defining [vileness] could be
tortured to mean that proof of an intentional killing is all the
proof necessary to establish that circumstance. We regard such a
construction as strained, unnatural, and manifestly contrary to
13. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (relying on Furman to affirm constitu-
tionality of death sentence and emphasizing Eighth Amendment's requirement that the death
sentence not be imposed arbitrarily or capriciously); see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972).
14. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
15. ' Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1980) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. S 27-
2534.1 (b) (7) (1978)) (striking down death sentence imposed under Georgia's vileness predicate
because the jury was not given adequate guidance in determining whether the murders met
the statutory criteria for vileness). The language of the vileness predicate in Virginia Code
S 19.2-264.2 is identical to the language in the Georgia statute which was held to be unconsti-
tutionally applied in Godfrey. See S 19.2-264.2.
16. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428. "Part of a State's responsibility ... is to define the crimes
for which death may be the sentence in a way that obviates standardless (sentencing] discre-
tion. It must channel the sentencer's discretion by clear and objective standards that provide
specific and detailed guidance and that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing
a sentence of death." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
17. See VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.2 (setting forth the conditions for imposing a
sentence of death, namely that the trier of fact must find the presence of vileness or future
dangerousness and recommend the death sentence).
18. Bunch v. Commonwealth, 304 S.E.2d 271, 285 (Va. 1983) (sustaining sentence of
death based on vileness aggravating factor); see Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428.
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legislative intent. The General Assembly was selective in choosing
the types of intentional homicide it fet justified a potential sen-
tence of death; clearly, then it did not intend to sweep all grades
of murder into the capital cfass.'
Surely then, the court should not object to jury instructions which enable
jurors to distinguish between those homicides which "justi y] a potential
sentence of death" and those which do not.2'
The terms "torture, depravity of mind [and] aggravated battery" are not
sufficiently defined, either in the statute or by case law.2' Each term, how-
ever, can be regarded as a "sub-element" of the vileness predicate.2 The
Supreme Court of Virginia has given certain constructions to some of the
sub-elements, and the definitions of the terms torture, depravity of mind,
and aggravated battery can be somewhat illuminated by examining the
judicial decisions which have found the presence of those sub-elements.
a. Torture
The Supreme Court of Virginia has not given a particular construction
to the sub-element "torture," though the term has been defined at common
law as "[t]o inflict intense pain to body or mind for purposes of punishment,
or to extract a confession or information, or for sadistic pleasure." The
court has also noted that the term torture "ordinarily connote[s] conduct
preceding the death of the victim."24 The court upheld a sentence of death
based on vileness when "[t]he systematic torturing of [the] victim by slash-
ing her with a machete and a knife, followed by comprehensive mutilation,
reflected relentless, severe, and protracted physical abuse inflicted with
brutality and ferocity of unparalleled atrociousness."" The language of
Fitzgerald, "relentless, severe, and protracted physical abuse" illustrates the
common law definition of torture and perhaps should be offered as part of
19. Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (Va. 1978) (affirming sentence of
death based on both statutory aggravating factors).
20. Id.
21. See S 19.2-264.2; see also Banghart, supra note 12, at 79.
22. For a more thorough discussion of the elevation of the sub-elements of the vileness
predicate to elements requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt and juror unanimity, see
generally M. Kate Calvert, Obtaining Unanimity and a Standard of Proof on the Vileness Sub-
Elements uith Apprendi v. New Jersey, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 1 (2000).
23. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1490 (6th ed. 1990). For a more thorough discussion
of the "torture" sub-element and the infrequency of the Commonwealth's reliance thereupon,
see Banghart, supra note 12, at 80-82.
24. Jones v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 554, 565 (Va. 1984) (affirming sentence of
death based on vileness predicate).
25. Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 292 S.E.2d 798, 813 (Va. 1982) (upholding sentence
of death and finding that it was not disproportionate to the sentence imposed in other capital
cases where the defendant raped or robbed the victim and the death sentences rested solely
on the vileness predicate).
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an instruction on vileness in cases involving physical torture. The Supreme
Court of Virginia held that sufficient evidence of psychological torture was
present when a defendant told his ten-year-old victim that he would take her
home but instead "took her into the woods, raped her, and then killed
her." 6 Torture, both physical and psychological, existed when a defendant
"violently raped and sodomized his child victim, severely injuring her before
strangling her to death."27 Both of these cases, Mueller and Spencer, upheld
a finding of vileness based on depravity of mind."8 Thus, while finding that
the defendants' actions constituted psychological torture, the court rested
its findings of vileness on the depravity of mind sub-element rather than the
torture sub-element of vileness.29
b. Depravity of Mind
In Smith v. Commonwealth," the Supreme Court of Virginia construed
the definition of the "depravity of mind" sub-element of vileness as "a degree
of moral turpitude and psychical debasement surpassing that inherent in the
definition of ordinary legal malice and premeditation.""1 In Stewart v.
Commonwealth,2 the defendant argued that the "execution-type murders"
of his wife and infant child did not exhibit depravity of mind." The Su-
preme Court of Virginia disagreed, finding that the shootings at close range
and the deliberate arrangement of the bodies were evidence that the defen-
dant's actions were "'more depraved' than ordinary murders and exhibited
the degree of moral turpitude defined in Smith."' As noted above, several
cases hold that psychological torture is evidence of depravity of mind." For
example, in Poynerv. Commonwealth,' the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled
that depravity of mind can be shown by proof of psychological torture.3
26. Mueller v. Commonwealth, 422 S.E.2d 380, 396 (Va. 1992) (affirming death
sentence and finding that the defendant's actions "extended over a period of time and under
such circumstances as to permit an inference of psychological torture").
27. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 609, 622-23 (Va. 1990) (affirming sentence
of death based on predicates of vileness and future dangerousness).
28. Mueller, 422 S.E.2d at 396; Spencer, 393 S.E.2d at 623.
29. Mueller, 422 S.E.2d at 396; Spencer, 393 S.E.2d at 623.
30. 248 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1978).
31. Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135,149 (Va. 1978). The victim in Smith was
raped, and died from asphyxia, drowning and multiple stab wounds. Id. at 139.
32. 427 S.E.2d 394 (Va. 1993).
33. Stewart v. Commonwealth, 427 S.E.2d 394, 409 (Va. 1993).
34. Id. (citing Smith, 248 S.E.2d at 149).
35. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
36. 329 S.E.2d 815 (Va. 1985).
37. Poyner v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 815, 832 (Va. 1985) (affirming five death
sentences based on predicates of vileness and future dangerousness, and holding that depravity
2000]
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One of Poyner's victims "had time to realize [his] deadly purpose and to
peer down the barrel of a .38-caliber pistol in the hands of a person who had
let her get a good look at his face."3" The victim obeyed all of Poyner's
demands and, according to defendant's testimony, begged for her life.39
Poyner let her walk away from him "toying with her, implying that she
might be spared" before he fatally shot her.4 The court determined that
such actions established depravity of mind on the part of the defendant,
sufficient to satisfy the vileness predicate." In Sheppard v. Commonwealth,42
the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that "[e]xecuting two persons in their
home and then stripping their bodies of jewelry and stealing their personal
property manifestly demonstrates a depravity of mind."43 The court pro-
vided no further discussion of why the murders in Sheppard were more
depraved than other murders. The facts in Gray v. Commonwealth" that
established depravity of mind apparently included the defendant's advance
planning of the murder, firing six shots into the back of the victim's head
while the victim lay face-down on the ground, and "laughter and total lack
of remorse" about the murder.4" The Virginia cases do not lend themselves
to formulating a clear set of hypothetical circumstances which evidence
depravity of mind. Situations ranging from murder plus robbery to murder
involving psychological torture to cold and calculated murder in which the
defendant takes pleasure have all been found to support a finding of deprav-
ity of mind.'
c. Aggravated Battery
The Supreme Court of Virginia construed the sub-element of "aggra-
vated battery to the victim" to mean "a battery which, qualitatively and
quantitatively, is more culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish
an act of murder."47 In Reid v. Commonwealth," the Supreme Court of





42. 464 S.E.2d 131 (Va. 1995).
43. Sheppard v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 131, 139 (Va. 1995).
44. 356 S.E.2d 157 (Va. 1987).
45. Gray v. Commonwealth, 356 S.E.2d 157, 179-80 (Va. 1987) (affirming sentence of
death based on finding aggravated battery and depravity of mind sufficient to constitute
vileness).
46. See supra notes 30-45 and accompanying text.
47. Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (Va. 1978) (affirming sentence of
death based on a finding of future dangerousness).
48. 506 S.E.2d 787 (Va. 1998).
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Virginia upheld a death sentence based on the aggravated battery sub-ele-
ment of the vileness predicate. 9 Reid stabbed his victim twenty-two times,
inflicting at least four fatal wounds."0 The court noted that "[t]he number
or nature of the batteries inflicted upon the victim is the essence of the test
whether the defendant's conduct was outrageously or wantonly vile, horri-
ble or inhuman in that it involved... an aggravated battery." " In Whitley
v. Commonwealth, 2 choking the victim with his hands, strangling the victim
with a rope, and cutting her jugular vein, along with the insertion of um-
brellas into the victim's vaginal and anal cavities constituted evidence of
aggravated battery to the victim sufficient for a finding of vileness.5 3 The
Supreme Court of Virginia has stated that "[a] death sentence based upon
vileness is not supported by the evidence where the victim died almost
instantaneously from a single gunshot wound."' Yet the court has found
vileness based on aggravated battery to the victim when the defendant
rapidly shot the victim in the head six times at close range. 5 The court also
found aggravated battery to the victim when the defendant shot a police
officer at least six times and the officer immediately lost consciousness,
dying within minutes.' The court upheld a finding of vileness based on
aggravated battery to the victim when the victim died from one gunshot,
but the defendant had abducted, robbed and raped her. 7
d. Defining Vileness
The Instructions should be amended to explain fully the meaning of the
statutory sub-elements of the vileness predicate. Unfortunately, there are
no clear "definitions" of the sub-elements which sufficiently guide juries in
distinguishing between factual situations in which a sentence of death is
warranted and situations in which life imprisonment is the appropriate
sentence. The Instructions already include language in addition to the sub-
49. Reid v. Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 787, 788-89 (Va. 1998).
50. Id. at 792.
51. Id. at 793 (quoting Boggs v. Commonwealth, 331 S.E.2d 407, 421 (Va. 1985))
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
52. 286 S.E.2d 162 (Va. 1982).
53. Whitley v. Commonwealth, 286 S.E.2d 162, 164-65, 171 (Va. 1982).
54. Peterson v. Commonwealth, 302 S.E.2d 520, 525 (Va. 1983) (citing Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.s. 420 (1980)).
55. Gray v. Commonwealth, 356 S.E.2d 157, 173, 180 (Va. 1987). For a discussion of
the relative vileness of murders involving a single gunshot wound compared with murders
involving multiple wounds, and the arbitrariness of the distinction between the two, see
Banghart, supra note 12, at 86-87.
56. Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 379, 383,391 (Va. 1994).
57. Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 634, 640 (Va. 1999) (upholding a sentence
of death based upon findings of vileness and future dangerousness).
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element of "aggravated battery to the victim.""8 The Instructions define this
sub-element as "aggravated battery to the victim beyond the minimum
necessary to accomplish the act of murder." 9 Language from past cases may
be helpful in fashioning jury instructions on the aggravated battery sub-
element in cases with analogous factual situations.' The Instructions should
be amended to reflect the definition of "depravity of mind" as that which is
shown by "a degree of moral turpitude and psychical debasement surpassing
that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal malice and premeditation.
The Instructions should also be amended to give jurors more guidance
regarding the sub-element of "torture." Perhaps a common-law definition
of "torture" such as "inflict[ion] of intense pain to body or mind for pur-
poses of punishment, or to extract a confession or information, or for
sadistic pleasure" should also be inserted into model jury instructions 33.122
and 33.125.'
2. The Elevation of the Vileness "Sub-Elements"
and the Requirement of Unanimity
The three factors, or "sub-elements," embedded in the vileness predicate
- torture, depravity of mind and aggravated battery -- are not currently
considered "elements" of vileness subject to a burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and a requirement that juries unanimously agree on their
presence.63 While a capital murder jury relying upon the vileness predicate
must find that the Commonwealth has proved "vileness" beyond a reason-
able doubt, it is not required to agree upon the presence of a specific sub-
element, nor must the Commonwealth prove any particular sub-element
beyond a reasonable doubt.6" Recent United States Supreme Court decisions
suggest, however, that proof beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimity as
to at least one of the three sub-elements may be constitutionally required.65
58. See VA. MODELJURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL No. 33.122 (Lexis Law Publishing
1999); see also Appendix A to this article for a jury instruction defining aggravated battery to
the victim.
59. Id.; see also VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL No. 33.125 (Lexis Law
Publishing 1999).
60. See supra Part MI(A)(1)(c).
61. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (Va. 1978); see also Appendix A
to this article for a jury instruction defining depravity of mind.
62. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1490 (6th ed. 1990), Instructions Nos. 33.122,
33.125; see also Appendix A to this article for a jury instruction defining torture.
63. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2000); Banghart, supra note 12, at 98-100.
64. See Banghart, supra note 12, at 98-100.
65. For a more complete discussion of why the "Sub-Elements" of Virginia's vileness
predicate are separate elements and the requirement that juries unanimously find the presence
of the elements of the vileness predicate, see Banghart, supra note 12, at 98. See generally
Calvert, supra note 22 (discussing recent Supreme Court decisions and the rationale for
[Vol. 13:1
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In Richardson v. United States' the Court held that when a federal statute
requires a jury to find "a continuing series of violations" the jury must be in
unanimous agreement that the defendant "committed each of the individual
'violations' necessary to make up that 'continuing series'" in order to find
the defendant guilty of violating the statute.' Rather than finding that a
"series of violations" was one element of the crime, the Court ruled that the
language "series of violations" referred to the individual acts that comprised
the series, thereby making each separate act a necessary element of the
crime." The "violations" in Richardson are analogous to the sub-elements
of Virginia's vileness predicate. The sub-elements of torture, depravity of
mind, and aggravated battery to the victim should be seen as alternate
elements, and the jury should be required to conclude unanimously that at
least one sub-element is present before it can impose a sentence of death
predicated upon a finding of vileness.
Another recent United States Supreme Court decision which lends
credence to the argument that the Constitution requires the vileness sub-
elements to be treated as elements of the vileness predicate is Apprendi v.
New Jersey.69 In Apprendi, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."'
Although at first glanceApprendi may seem inapplicable to Virginia's capital
sentencing scheme, wherein the "prescribed statutory maximum" is death,
the principles of the case can be construed as applicable when there is no
sentencing "range" at issue but rather a stark choice between a sentence of
life incarceration and a sentence of death.71 If a defendant's constitutional
rights are violated by basing an increase in his term of incarceration upon
facts which are not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, surely those same
Fourteenth Amendment rights are violated by predicating a sentence of
elevating the vileness "factors" to "elements" and requiring that they be found unanimously
by capital sentencing juries).
66. 526 U.S. 813 (1999).
67. Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 815 (1999) (holding that in order to
convict a defendant of engaging in a series of violations the jury must unanimously find the
specific violations which make up the series).
68. Id. at 818-24.
69. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348,2362-63 (2000) (holding provision of New
Jersey's hate crime statute which allowed trial court to enhance defendant's sentence beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum without proof of the enhancing facts beyond a reasonable
doubt unconstitutional).
70. Id. at 2362-63.
71. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4 (Michie 2000); see also Calvert, supra note 22.
2000]
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death (a far more drastic and final sentence than any term of years) upon
evidence which is not subjected to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'
3. Suggested Amendment of the Virginia Model jury Instructions
The suggested amendments of the pertinent portion of Virginia Model
Jury Instruction 33.125 are set forth in brackets as follows:
You have convicted the defendant of an offense which may be
punished by death. You must decide whether the defendant shall
be sentenced to death or to imprisonment for life or to imprison-
ment for life and a fine of a specific amount but not more than
$100,000.00. Before the penalty can be fixed at death, the Com-
monwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following
aggravating circumstance: That his conduct in committing the
offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman
in that it involved [at least one of the following elements:]3
[(a)] torture [as shown by infliction of intense physical or
mental pain for purposes of punishment, extracting informa-
tion, or sadistic pleasure,]f4 [or]
[2b)] depravity of mind [as shown by a degree of moral turpi-
tude and psychical debasement beyond the ordinary level of
moral turpitude and psychical debasement taken into account
by the ordinary legal lefinition of malice and premeditation,]
or
(c) aggravated battery to the victim beyond the minimum
necessary to accomplish the act of murder.7 6
[You must unanimously find that the Commonwealth has
proven one or more of the above-named elements beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. You must unanimously agree as to which
element[s] the Commonwealth has proven beyond a reasonabledoubt.]'
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has
proved [at least one element of] 8 that circumstance beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you may fix the punishment at death.
Any decision you make regarding punishment must be unani-
mous.
72. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (stating that -[d]eath, in
its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one
of only a year or two").
73. See supra Part lTl(A)(2).
74. See supra Part M(A)(1)(a).
.75. See supra Part M(A)(l)(b).
76. See supra Part M(A)(1)(c).
77. See supra Part HI(A)(2).
78. See supra Part re(A)(2).
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B. Future Dangerousness
1. Future Dangerousness Evidence
Virginia Code section 19.2-264.2 states in pertinent part that:
In assessing the penalty of any person convicted of an offense for
which the death penalty maybe imposed, a sentence of death shall
not be imposed unless the court or jury shall (1) after consider-
ation of the past criminal record of convictions of the defendant,
find that there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of vi3lence that would constitute a continuing seri-
ous threat to society.... ."
Section 19.2-264.4 allows evidence of "the circumstances surrounding
the offense, the history and background of the defendant, and any other
facts in mitigation of the offense" to be introduced in the penalty phase of
a capital murder case in which the Commonwealth intends to prove the
future dangerousness of the defendant.8" The Supreme Court of Virginia has
noted that section 19.2-264.4 "does not restrict the admissible evidence to
the record of convictions," and the court ruled in Poyner that it was not
error to admit evidence of prior unadjudicated criminal conduct." The
current version of the Instructions states that the Commonwealth must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "after consideration of his history and
ackground, there is a probability that he would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.""
2. Raising the Standard of Prooffor Prior Unadjudicated Bad Acts
In Pruett v. Commonwealth"' the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that
"evidence of prior criminal acts of violence, whether adjudicated or not, is
relevant to a determination of future dangerousness."84 In Walker v. Com-
monwealth,8" the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the defendant's argu-
79. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2000). For an extensive discussion of the
future dangerousness predicate, see Jason J. Solomon, Future Dangerousness: Issues and
Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 55 (1999).
80. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 2000).
81. See Peterson v. Commonwealth, 302 S.E.2d 520, 526 (Va. 1983) (affirming death
sentence based on a finding of future dangerousness, and ruling that the pendency of an
appeal of a prior conviction does not affect the admissibility of evidence of that conviction);
Poyner v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 815, 827-28 (Va. 1985) (upholding sentences of death
and ruling that it was not error to admit into evidence a videotape showing defendant's
confession to the two murders for which he was on trial, plus three additional murders).
82. VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL Nos. 33.122, 33.125 (Lexis Law
Publishing 1999).
83. 351 S.E.2d 1 (Va. 1986).
84. Pruett v. Commonwealth, 351 S.E.2d 1, 12 (Va. 1986) (affirming sentence of death
and approving admission of evidence of prior unadjudicated criminal conduct).
85. 515 S.E.2d 565 (Va. 1999).
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ment that "without a positive connection of the evidence to the defendant
by some standard of proof, the evidence does not meet the test of rele-
vancy."86 The court stated that "[whether the evidence produced establishes
the ultimate fact at issue must, of course, be tested by some standard of
proof."" In Walker, the ultimate issue of fact which the Commonwealth
was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt was whether Walker
would pose a threat to society in the future. 8 The court rejected the argu-
ment that "each piece of evidence offered to prove the ultimate issue of fact
must itself also be tested by some standard of proof," stating that each piece
of evidence is "tested by the credibility or weight the fact finder chooses to
give it. In effect,the Commonwealth can introduce evidence of prior
crimes, claim that the defendant committed those crimes, and use the
evidence of those crimes as proof that the defendant poses a threat of future
dangerousness to society. Yet the Commonwealth is not held to any
standard of proof with regard to such evidence. The jury is left to decide
what "credi~ility or weight" to give such evidence.
90
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions suggest that the individ-
ual prior bad acts introduced by the Commonwealth should be subject to
a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.9 Applying the rationale set
forth above in Part M-A-2 of this article for applying the Apprendi v. New
Jersey standard to evidence introduced in the penalty phase of a capital
murder trial and keeping in mind that death is the ultimatepunishment .a
society can impose, the Commonwealth should be required to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that a defendant committed prior unadjudicated
bad acts which the Commonwealth introduces as evidence of future danger-
ousness.
92
3. The Relevance of Parole and Prison Life Evidence
The Instructions now include Instruction number 33.126, which
provides that "[t]he words 'imprisonment for life' mean imprisonment for
fe without possibility of parole."9" Due to the fact that capital murder




90. See id. For more discussion of the proof of future dangerousness by unadjudicated
acts of criminal conduct, see Solomon, supra note 79, at 63-66.
91. See supra Part M(A)(2). For a more thorough discussion of the Apprendi standard,
see Calvert, supra note 22.
92. See supra Part lII(A)(2) (setting forth the rationale for requiring proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of evidence of statutory aggravating factors); Woolson v. orth Carolina,
428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (noting that "the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a
sentence of imprisonment, however long.... Because of that qualitative difference, there is
a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment in a specific case."); see also Calvert, supra note 22.
93. VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL No. 33.126 (Lexis Law Publishing
[Vol. 13:1
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
defendants sentenced to life in prison for crimes committed after January 1,
1995, are never eligible for parole" the entire context of the future danger-
ousness inquiry is transformed." Arguably, the "society" to which the
defendant may or may not "constitute a continuing serious threat" is no
longer society at large, but instead the society within the prison in which
the defendant will spend the remainder of his days.' Although the Supreme
Court of Virginia has held that prison life evidence is inadmissible as mitiga-
tion evidence, such evidence is relevant and should be admissible as evidence
in rebuttal of the Commonwealth's evidence of future dangerousness.97 The
Instructions, therefore, should reflect the context in which the defendant's
potential future dangerousness is to be judged. Evidence of the structure of
prison life, as well as security and safety procedures, should be admitted to
show that the defendant will have fewer opportunities and less potential for
committing dangerous acts in the prison society.98
4. Suggested Amendment of the Model July Instructions
In light of the issues discussed above, the suggested amendments to the
pertinent portion of Virginia Model Jury Instruction 33.125 are set forth in
brackets as follows:
You have convicted the defendant of an offense which may be
punished by death. You must decide whether the defendant shall
be sentenced to death or to imprisonment for life or to imprison-
ment for life and a fine of a specific amount but not more than
$100,000.00. Before the penalty can be fixed at death, the Com-
monweath must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following
aggravating circumstance:
1999). For a discussion of the relevance of prison life evidence to cases in which future
dangerousness is at issue, see Solomon, supra note 79, at 71-73.
94. See VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-165.1 (Michie 2000) (abolishing parole for offenders
convicted of a felony occurring on or after January 1, 1995); VA. CODE ANN. S 53.1-40.01
(Michie 2000) (geriatric parole is not available to inmates convicted of a class one felony,
committed on or after January 1, 1995).
95. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 2000); see also Solomon, supra note 79, at
70-71.
96. See S 19.2-264.2; see also Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 166 n.5 (1994)
(noting that "the fact that a defendant is parole ineligible does not prevent the State from
arguing that the defendant poses a future danger. The State is free to argue that the defendant
will pose a danger to others in prison . .).
97. See Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 642, 653 (Va. 1999) (upholding death
sentence based on findings of future dangerousness and vileness, and holding that prison life
evidence does not concern the history or experience of the defendant and thus is not relevant
mitigation evidence); Walker v. Commonwealth, 515 S.E.2d 565,574 (Va. 1999) (holding that
evidence of prison life is not mitigating evidence).
98. Attorneys may contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse to obtain a form
motion for the admission of prison life evidence.
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That, after consideration of his history and background [in-
cluding prior convictions and prior crimes which the Com-
monwealth has proven beyond a reasonable doubt], there is a
probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence
that wouldconstitute a continuing serious threat to [the] soci-
ety [of the prison in which he will be incarcerated].
Any decision you make regarding punishment must be
unanmous.00
Additionally, counsel should always proffer Instruction 33.126, the "life
means life" instruction, in conjunction with the proposed instruction on
future dangerousness.' °' Counsel should also request a "death not required"
instruction. 10
IV Consequences to Defendants of Proposing Handcrafted Jury Instructions
The proffering of the jury instructions suggested above raises serious
questions regarding the consequences to a defendant of the use of such
instructions. Does a defendant waive his objections to the constitutionality
of Virginia's statutory death penalty scheme by proffering such instructions?
This author could find no reported authority in Virginia for the proposition
that a capital defendant waives his objections to the constitutionality of the
capital sentencing scheme by proffering handcrafted instructions.0  How-
ever, common sense indicates that if such instructions are accepted, in whole
or in part, by the trial court the defendant will not be permitted to object
to the constitutionality of the aspect of the sentencing scheme that was
"cured" by his proffered instructions. A defendant who does not object to
a jury instruction at trial waives his right to object to that instruction."° A
defendant whose proffered instruction is accepted will not object to that
instruction being given to the jury, and thus will have waived any objection
99. See supra Part M11(B).
100. See VA. MODELJURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL No. 33.125 (Lexis Law Publishing
1999).
101. VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL No. 33.126 (Lexis Law Publishing
1999). See supra Part M(B)(3).
102. In Commonwealth of Virginia v. Tice, the judge for the Circuit Court for the City
of Norfolk instructed the jury in part as follows: "I want you to know that nothing in these
instructions nor in the law requires you to sentence this defendant to death, no matter what
your findings may be." Commonwealth of Virginia v. Tice, Cr. Nos. 98-2980-00 and 98-2980-
01 (Tr: at. 1045) (Feb. 14, 2000) (unreported decision).
103. Further, Code 5 19.2-263.2 expressly permits defendants to offer jury instructions
.which constitute( ] an accurate statement of the law." VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-263.2 (Michie
2000).
104. See Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 59 S.E.2d 102, 109 (Va. 1950) (noting that a
defendant waives his objection to improper remarks of counsel if he does not promptly
request a curative instruction).
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to that portion of the statutory sentencing scheme which was "cured" by
instructing the jury according to the defendant's statement of the law. For
instance, if a trial court accepts a defendant's proffered instruction limiting
the consideration of future dangerousness to the defendant's future danger-
ousness in prison the defendant may have waived his objection to the
constitutionality of the future dangerousness predicate insofar as the objec-
tion relates to the jury's consideration of defendant's future dangerousness
to society at large."05
Counsel should be prepared to proffer alternate jury instructions. °" In
the event that the trial court rejects one of the proposed instructions,
counsel should present the court with an alternate version of the instruction.
For instance, if the court rejects the model instruction on irileness suggested
by this article, 7 ruling that the sub-elements are not elements which must
be proven by the Commonwealth beyond a reasonable doubt and found
unanimously by the jury, counsel should submit an alternate version of the
instruction which includes at least the definitions of the sub-elements."' If
the trial court rejects both proffered instructions, defendant's objections to
the constitutionality of the vileness predicate will be preserved." 9 If the
court uses the instruction which gives the definitions of the sub-elements,
but does not elevate the sub-elements to elements requiring proof beyond
a reasonable doubt and unanimity, the defendant's objections to the consti-
tutionality of the vileness predicate regarding the standard of proof and
unanimity will be preserved."0
V Conclusion
This article has proposed reforms of the Virginia Model Jury Instruc-
tions Criminal."' The proposed instructions and accompanying explana-
tions are intended to guide counsel in fashioning their own jury instructions
for use in the penalty phase of capital trials. The proposed instructions
consist of the law of Virginia as declared by the Supreme Court of Virginia,
as well as interpretations of the law that have not yet been expressly ac-
105. See supra Part M(B)(4).
106. Counsel should also offer alternative verdict forms. For examples of alternative
verdict formsf roffered and accepted by a trial judge in a Virginia capital case, see Appendix
B to this article.
107. See supra Part l(A)(3).
108. See supra Part 111(A)(3).
109. See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445, 456 n.8 (Va. 1999) (noting that
.where a party proffers an alternative instruction that is a correct statement of the law, this,
without more, will be adequate to preserve for appeal a challenge to the instruction actually
given") (internal citations omitted).
110. See id.
111. VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL (Lexis Law Publishing 1999).
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cepted or rejected by the court. Jurors in capital cases should be provided
with instructions that maximize their ability to distinguish circumstances in
which the death penalty should be imposed from circumstances in which it
is not warranted.
112





COMMONWEALTH V. CHARLES DOUGLAS RINER
The Honorable Robert Stump of the Circuit Court of Wise County,
Virginia, approved the following instructions, along with Instructions
33.122 and 33.126, in the case of the Commonwealth of Virginia v. Charles
Douglas Riner:n"
D-P 11 [capital murder sentencing]
To find vileness you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
crime as committed by the defendant involved torture as defined in instruc-
tion D-P6, or evidenced depravity of mind as defined in instruction D-P7,
or constituted an aggravated battery as defined in instruction D-P8. You
must agree unanimously which of these elements supports your finding of
vileness. If you cannot agree unanimously on one of the vileness elements,
then you cannot find that the defendant's conduct was vile.
To find future dangerousness you must find beyond a reasonable
doubt, after consideration of the defendant's history and background, that
there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt future dangerousness as an aggravating circum-
stance, then you may fix the punishment of the defendant at death. But if
you nevertheless believe from all the evidence, including evidence in mitiga-
tion, that the death penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punish-
ment of the defendant at:
(1) Imprisonment for life; or
(2) Imprisonment for life and a fine of a specific amount, but not more
than $100,000.00.
If you find from the evidence that the Commonwealth has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt vileness as an aggravating circumstance and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt the presence of one of the elements of
vileness, namely, torture, depravity of mind, or aggravated battery, then you
may fix the punishment of the defendant at death. But if you nevertheless
believe from all the evidence, including evidence in mitigation, that the
113. Riner was not convicted of capital murder. Thus, the approved capital murder
sentencing instructions were never given to the jury.
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death penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment of the
defendant at:
(1) Imprisonment for life; or
(2) Imprisonment for life and a fine of a specific amount, but not more
than $100,000.00.
If the Commonwealth has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
future dangerousness or vileness and one of the vileness elements, then you
shall fix the punishment of the defendant at:
(1) Imprisonment for life; or
(2) Imprisonment for life and a fine of a specific amount, but not more
than $100,000.00.
Any decision you make regarding punishment must be unanimous.
D-P6 [definition of torture]
Torture means the infliction of intense pain to the body or mind for
purposes of punishment, or to extract a confession or information, or for
sadistic pleasure.
D-P7 [definition of depravity of mind]
Depravity of mind means a degree of moral turpitude and psychical
debasement surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal
malice and premeditation.
D-P8 [definition of aggravated battery]
Aggravated battery is a battery which, qualitatively and quantitatively,
is more culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act of
murder. The number or nature of the batteries inflicted upon the victim is






The following alternative verdict forms were approved for use in the
case of the Commonwealth of Virginia v. Charles Douglas Riner:"4
Verdict Form (Alternative #1)
We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant guilty
of capital murder and having unanimously found beyond a reasonable
doubt after consideration of his history and background that there is a
probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing serious threat to society,
and
having unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct in
committing the offense is outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or in-
human in that it involved
torture_
depravity of mind
aggravated battery to the victim beyond the minimum necessary
to accomplish the act of murder
[Foreman must initial one or more of the above elements only if found
beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously agreed upon]
and having considered the evidence in mitigation of the offense, unani-
mously fix his punishment at death.
FOREMAN
114. Riner was not convicted of capital murder. Thus, these verdict forms were never
given to the jury.
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Verdict Form (Alternative #2)
We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant guilty
of capital murder and having unanimously found beyond a reasonable
doubt after consideration of his history and background that there is a
probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing serious threat to society, and having considered
the evidence in mitigation of the offense, unanimously fix his
punishment at death.
FOREMAN
Verdict Form (Alternative #3)
We, the jury, on the issue joined having found the defendant guilty
of capital murder and having unanimously found beyond a reasonable
doubt that his conduct in committing the offense is outrageously or wan-
tonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved
torture-
depravity of mind___ ;
aggravated battery to the victim beyond the minimum necessary
to accomplish the act of murder
[Foreman must initial one or more of the above elements only if found
beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously agreed upon]
and having considered the evidence in mitigation of the offense, unani-




Verdict Form (Alternative #4)
We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant guilty
of capital murder and having considered all the evidence in aggravation
and mitigation of such offense, fix his punishment at imprisonment for
life.
FOREMAN
Verdict Form (Alternative #5)
We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the defendant guilty
of capital murder and having considered all the evidence in aggravation
and mitigation of such offense, fix his punishment at imprisonment for
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